In the year 2000, the American submarine force will celebrate the first century of service by highly skilled people in some of the most technologically advanced vessels ever built. The past 100 years have witnessed the evolution of a force that mastered submersible warfare, introduced nuclear propulsion to create the true submarine, and for decades patrolled the deep ocean front line; the hottest part of an otherwise Cold War.
Submarines in War The U. S. Navy’s involvement with the submarine dates form 1888 when the Bureau of Construction and Repair (BUC&R) sponsored a design competition that brought John Holland a naval contract to build the experimental Plunger. As the new century dawned, prominent American naval leaders like Admiral George Dewey called the submarine a real threat to international surface forces, leading the Navy to acquire its first submarine in 1900. Overcoming competition from fellow American inventor, Simon Lake, Holland sold his newest model, Holland VI, to the Navy for $160,000 on April 11.
This 64-ton submarine commissioned as USS Holland, or SS-1, on October 12 of the same year, was equipped with an Otto-type gasoline engine for surface running and electric motors for submerged operations. Due to the volatility of gasoline, American submersible designs soon followed the French practice, adopting the diesel engine in 1909 with the Electric Boat Company’s F class (SS-20 through 23), built at Union Iron Works in San Francisco. Combining the influence of diesel propulsion with the submersible designs of Holland and Lake, American submersibles took a familiar configuration through American entry into the Great War.
Submarines of the E, H, K, L, M, N, O, and R classes and ranged in displacement form 287 to 510 tons, with the fastest boats displaying a top surface speed of barely 14 knots on diesel power. During World War I the U. S. Navy separated these submersibles into two groups according to mission. “Boats” of the N and O classes, as well as some of the E type, patrolled American coasts and harbors following a defensive strategy. Other submarines drew assignments that sent them to hostile European waters after 1917. Some K-, L-, O-, and E-class boats conducted offensive, open-sea operations from the Azores and Bantry Bay in Ireland.
They supported the Allied effort to maintain open sea lanes along the European coast and in the approaches to the British Isles. The Nay Department’s plans for these vessels reflected the prevailing surface warfare thinking, which perceived the submersible as a type of destroyer or torpedo boat that should operate with the battle fleet. Thus the first foray into submarine design by the Bureau of Steam Engineering produced the faster 15-knot, 800 ton, S-class submarine in 1916 with the assistance of Electric Boat received a commission to design the three boats of the 20-knowt T, or AA class, with a normal displacement of 1107 tons.
On paper these characteristics, adopted during the First World War, brought the Navy one step closer to the “fleet submarine”, a submersible that could keep the pace with the battle fleet. Shaping an Identity The German U-boats of the 1914-1918 conflict gave the American officers and designers reason for pause. Physically durable, powered by very reliable diesels, technically blessed with the very long sea legs, they provided the paradigm for American interwar development.
At the same time, the 1916 vintage American S-class proved a virtual clinic for basic design mistakes, burdened with the difficult metallurgical problems and very unreliable diesels. While Rear Admirals Harry Yarnell and Samuel Robinson, successive interwar chiefs of the Bureau of Engineering, worked to remedy the technical flaws with solutions form European and American engineering practice, the community of submarine officers struggled with a problem even more fundamental than propulsion. How should the Navy use submarines? What was their proper strategic role?
During the interwar period influential officers like Captains Thomas Hart and Yates Stirling Jr. , Admirals Henry Wiley and Frank Schofield, and the innovative commander Thomas Withers debated these issues with the German paradigm in mind. Unfortunately, this model did not offer easy direction. While the German commercial warfare strategy and independent patrol tactics had great effect on the war effort of the Entente and its allies, incidents like the sinking of the passenger liner RMS Lusitania painted this style of warfare with a dark brush, suggesting immorality when submersibles operated without restriction.
Only a subtle formula could help American submariners address questions of identity and mission in such a political environment. Since the state of design and propulsion technology would not permit American industry to build a submarine durable and fast enough to keep pace with the battlefleet, operating with surface ships on a regular basis seemed unlikely. This forced submarine strategists like Withers to look more closely at independent patrols and a model that approximated the World War I German experience.
On isolationist postwar America, however, this option brought with it the ethical burden of unrestricted U-boat warfare and civilian casualties, something a Navy diminished by the Washington Treaties did not care to assume. Thus, American submarine strategy could not include unrestricted submarine warfare, which might turn neutral commercial vessels and innocent civilians into victims. American officers realized that war in all of its brutality, not peacetime politics or worthy ethical concerns, would determine the future challenges faced by the submarine force.
In spite of official policy, the boats under construction in the 1930s reflected assertive, offensive strategic thinking as the country came to terms with the Depression under Franklin Roosevelt and the Bureaus of Construction and Repair and Engineering resolved the submarine engineering and propulsion slimes. The new Salmon-Sargo designs were intended for long-range independent patrols, with the requisite food, fuel, and weapons capacity.
In addition, the fleet exercises and war game scenarios during the late 1930s permitted these vessels to attack warships, convoy escort ships, and even certain convoys identified as critical to enemy logistical support. By 1940, the submarine force had answered its fundamental strategic questions and had the vessels to carry out the consequent roles and missions. Thus, when Admiral Thomas Hart proclaimed unrestricted submarine warfare against Japan on December 8, 1941, it came as no surprise. the submarine force know what to do. Victory
Employing the extremely reliable boats of the Gato, Balao, and Tench classes, the submarine force scored the most complete victory of any force in any theater of the war. In spite of a hesitant beginning due to the Pearl Harbor surprise and difficulties with the defective torpedoes, the submarine force destroyed 1,314 enemy ships for 5. 3 million tons which translated into fifty-five percent of all enemy ships lost. Out of 16,000 submariners, the force lost 375 officers and 3,131 enlisted men in fifty-two submarines, the lowest casualty rate of any combatant submarine service on any side in the 1939-1945 conflict.
While the Japanese advanced quickly after Pearl Harbor and the Navy struggled to recover from December 7, 1941, the submarine force brought the war to the enemy operating from Pearl Harbor, and Australian bases at Freemantle, and Brisbane. Submarines played a variety of roles in the war effort, demonstrating the versatility of stealth. Among those allied warships regularly able to penetrate Japanese controlled areas, American submarines had extraordinary success against both Japanese merchantmen and warships.
The late summer of 1942, Lieutenant Commander Henry C. Bruton in command of USS Greenling on her third war patrol destroyed 32,050 toms of enemy merchant shipping and damaged a 22,000 ton converted carrier. Bruton ended the war ranked thirteenth among the submarine force’s aces. Refining their methods of attack made American submariners the worst enemy of any ship flying the Japanese flag. In early 1943, USS Wahoo put to sea on her third war patrol under the command of Lieutenant Commander Dudley W. Morton.
Morton and his executive officer, Lieutenant Richard O’Kane, implemented and further refined a new method of attack suggested by Admiral James Fife, commander of the American submarines operating out of Brisbane. While O’Kane manned the periscope and made all of the observations, Morton was left free to evaluate the entire combat situation, making possible swift, informed, and effective approach and attack decisions. The talent of Morton and O’Kane as well as their new command and control procedure enabled Wahoo to sink 31,890 tons of Japanese shipping on that patrol.
Morton received the first of four Navy Crosses and his ship took home a Presidential Unit Citation. Later in the war, as commanding officer of USS Tang, Richard O’Kane received the Congressional Medal of Honor and became the Submarine Force’s leading ace of the war, credited with destroying 31 ships for 227,800 tons. In addition, Submarines played both humane and special operations roles in their campaign against Japan. In many of the hardest fought battles of the war submarine crews rescued unlucky carrier pilots who ended up in the sea, like future president, George Bush.
Fleet submarines also delivered troops tasked with special missions against Japanese Pacific strongholds. In August 1942, USS Nautilus [SS-169] and USS Argonaut [SS-165] delivered Marine Colonel Evans F. Carlson’s “Raiders” to Makin Island. Upon completing their mission to reconnoiter the island and destroy its most important facilities, the two submarines picked up the Marines and returned to Pearl Harbor. In the final months of the war, American submarines had difficulty finding targets because the Japanese had virtually no ships left the sink. Undaunted, submarine commanders pursued the enemy into his harbors and hiding places.
Employing newly developed FM sonar sets, American submarines penetrated the minefields of closely guarded Japanese home waters to seek out warships and supply ships at anchor. There was no place to hide. The silent victory was complete. Deep Ocean, Cold War Undersea warfare underwent a revolution after World War II and the American submarine force led the way. Building on the advanced submarine designs created by the Germans during World War II, the Navy anticipated submarines of the future going deeper, staying there longer, and moving much faster.
Indeed, in reports submitted in 1949 and 1950, naval and civilian advisors suggested that advanced German U-boat technology exploited by the Soviets might present the most potent postwar naval threat to the United States. No warship of the time could effectively detect and track a submarine like the German Type 21 which could sustain a 17 knot submerged speed for at least thirty minutes. Almost immediately after the war, the submarine force began experimenting with high speed, sophisticated silencing techniques, sensitive sonic detection, and deeper diving.
The result took the shape of the greater underwater propulsive power, or Guppy, conversions which changed the configuration of wartime submersibles to enhance submerged speed and hydrodynamic efficiency. The Tang class, the first truly new postwar construction, represented an initial step on a new road toward greater speed and endurance below the surface. It also provided the basic hull form used for the first true submarine. USS Nautilus went to sea propelled by a pressurized water nuclear plant in January 1955 and set a new standard for this type of vessel.
Its submerged endurance was limited only by the crews’ periodic need to see both their families and the light of day. Rather than a surface ship capable of submerging when the need arose, this submarine’s natural environment lay below the surface. Seawolf and the Skate class hunter-killer submarines quickly followed Nautilus and together they demonstrated the new extent of submarine effectiveness, from the deep ocean, to the shallows, to the polar regions. This was the vessel John Holland wanted to create but could not because of the limits of science and technology at the turn of the century.
Land, Sea, and Air The advent of nuclear submarines provided the final piece to a number of promising technical puzzles. The quest for the greater submerged speed, initiated in earnest after 1945, found its way to the Navy’s David Taylor Model Basin just as Admiral Hyman Rickover’s nuclear propulsion project succeeded with Nautilus. the research at David Taylor provided insights into the ideal hull form for high speed submarines. With the conventionally-powered experimental Albacore, submariners reached an extraordinary submerged speed.
In the fast attack submarine [SSN] USS Skipjack the endurance of nuclear propulsion and the highspeed of the Albacore teardrop hull came together to form the new paradigm. Every American submarine since 1958 has followed the same basic formula. The attack submarines proved very effective during the Cold War in addressing the Soviet submarine threat in the north Atlantic and Northwest Pacific through surveillance and deterrence. The Nautilus-Albacore combination also served to extend the reach of the submarine force.
While the Navy experimented with launching air breathing missiles like the Regulus from submarines during the late 1950s, the mobility, stealth, and endurance of nuclear submarines on the Skipjack model proved the ideal platform for launching ballistic missiles. From the Polaris A-1 in 1960, through multiple generations of missile submarines [SSBN] have provided the ultimate nuclear deterrent. As opposed to easily targeted land-based missiles easily targeted, SSBN’s are in constant motion, hiding deep in the ocean, with virtually unlimited endurance, capable of reaching almost any target at the direction of the President.
With the current Ohio class SSBN’s the submarine force employs this is the most effective and survivable component of current American strategic nuclear defense. Since the 1970s, the submarine force has also provided the Navy with a stealthy way of applying tactical firepower against land and sea targets. These were ballistic missile submarines. This class incorporated tremendous improvements in noise quieting, ease of maintenance and performance over earlier designs. In addition, this class introduced a more accurate and longer range missile that eliminated the need for these submarines to be homeported overseas.
Submarine Roles and Missions The fundamental changes in the U. S. Submarine Force since the end of the Cold war involve major shifts in submarine warfighting concepts and doctrine, form the deterrence of global war to the support of U. S. national interests in regional crises and conflicts; from a primary Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) orientation against nuclear powered submarines to taking full advantage of the modern submarine’s multi-mission capabilities; from weapon loadouts of primarily MK 48 torpedoes to Tomahawk Land-Attack missiles or other weapons.
This changing operational context has rippled through all elements of U. S. submarine operations, from peacetime presence to strategic deterrence. The transitions in the submarine force follow directly from the transitions in the world order and the evolving nature of the U. S. Navy. The world order has shifted from bi-polar super power alignment to a multi-polar collection of interests. While the likelihood of global conflict is greatly reduced, there is an increasing chance of regional conflict. The composition and operational posture of the U. S. Navy reflects this, having changed from a blue water emphasis to a littoral emphasis.
For the submarine force this has meant several changes in roles: *Prior to the end of the Cold War, Anti-Submarine Warfare was the major role for U. S. Attack Submarines. Now U. S. submarines are more multi-mission oriented. *Intelligence gathering has shifted from strategic to tactical reconnaissance. *The “Silent Service” is no longer completely silent, but exchanges information covertly with other U. S. forces. The submarine force is learning how to synergistically interoperate with other Navy and Joint communities for mutual mission accomplishment.
This includes “community alliances” such as: *Force Protection/Strike with Aircraft Carrier Battle Groups and Amphibious Ready Groups. *Special Warfare with Special Operating Forces (such as Navy SEALs). *Intelligence with the Surveillance community. Peacetime Engagement Although the United States is at peace, there is always the potential of regional crises threatening to erupt into armed conflict. During the past half-century, the U. S. has become involved in similar regional conflicts and crises.
Recently the Navy had played major roles in the evacuation of Americans and other foreign nationals from the unrest in Liberia (Operation Sharp Edge), the liberation of Kuwait and the destruction of Iraq’s offensive capability (Operation Desert Storm), and the simultaneous rescue of Americans from revolution in Somalia (Operation Eastern Exit). In peacetime the deployment of submarines in forward areas can demonstrate U. S. interest in the region. Alternatively, submarines are valuable if the President decides that interest should not be visible until a specific time.
The long endurance and high transit speeds of nuclear submarines make them particularly attractive for rapid deployments to forward areas in such circumstances. Once on station the attack submarine can be highly visible-in 1991 U. S. submarines conducted more than 200 port visits to 50 cities around the world- invisible. This operational flexibility is combined with the versatile firepower of the modern attack submarine. Also, the same submarine can also be used to land small groups of special operations forces, or to conduct surveillance of an area, or carry out electronic surveillance to gain valuable intelligence.
These submarines can also operate independently or in direct support of carrier battle groups, surface task forces, or with other submarines. Surveillance and Intelligence For the past 45 years the attack submarine has been an invaluable platform for surveillance, intelligence, and warning. This capability comes from the submarine’s stealth characteristic…. he ability to enter an area to watch, to listen, to collect information without being seen. While satellites and aircraft are used to garner various types of information, their operations are inhibited by weather, cloud cover, and the locations of collection targets.
In some situations it is difficult to keep a satellite or an aircraft in a position to conduct sustained surveillance of a specific area. And, of course, satellites and aircraft are severely limited in their ability to observe or detect underwater activity. Submarines have been employed in various forms of surveillance and intelligence collection throughout the Cold War. Continuing regional crises and conflicts will require such operations in support of U. S. and allied interests.
In the future, submarines may also use Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV) or drones to collect intelligence or conduct sustained surveillance of critical regions of the world. These vehicles will be sent out from a submarine to carry sensors into areas where it may not be safe or prudent for the submarine to venture. After fulfilling its mission, the AUV could return to the launching submarine, or transmit the data underwater or to a satellite. Information is vital to American political and military leaders if they are to make proper judgments, decisions, and plans.
As Winston Churchill wrote: “The great thing is to get the true picture, whatever it is”. Submarines are important in the array of methods by which the true picture can be obtained. Special Operations Submarines have long been used for special operations; carrying commandos, reconnaissance teams, and agents on high-risk missions. Most special operations by U. S. submarines are carried out by SEALs, the Sea-Air-Land teams trained for missions behind enemy lines. These special forces can be inserted by fixed-wing aircraft, helicopter, parachute, or surface craft, but in most scenarios only submarines guarantee covert delivery.
Once in the objective area, SEALs can carry to combat search-and-rescue operations, reconnaissance, sabotage, diversionary attacks, monitoring of enemy movements or communications, and a host of other clandestine and often high-risk missions. Nuclear-powered submarines are especially will-suited for this role because of their high-speed endurance and stealth. U. S. uclear powered submarines have repeatedly demonstrated the ability to carry to special operations involving many swimmers.
During exercises, which include Army, Air Force, and Marine Corps special operations personnel as well as SEALs, submarines recover personnel who parachute form fixed-wing aircraft and rappel down form helicopters into the sea, take them aboard, and subsequently launch them on missions. The Special Warfare Team Missions include: *Combat Swimmer Attacks *Reconnaissance and Surveillance *Infiltration/Exfiltration Across the Beach *Beach Feasibility Studies, Hydrographic Survey, and Surf Observation Teams in upport of amphibious landing operations.
Any U. S. submarine can be employed to carry SEALs, however, the Navy has several submarines that have been specially modified to carry swimmers and their equipment more effectively, including the installation of chambers called Dry Deck Shelters (DDSs) to house Swimmer Delivery Vehicles (SDVs). These submarines retain their full suite of weapons and sensors for operations as attack submarines. But they have special fittings, modifications to their air systems and other features to enable them to carry DDSs.
The DDS can be used to transport and launch an SDV or to “lock-out” combat swimmers. A DDS can be installed in about 12 hours and is air-transportable, further increasing special operations flexibly. Several units of the STURGEON (SSN 637) class can carry one chamber each, while two former ballistic missile submarines can accommodate two shelters each. The DDS, fitted aft of the submarine’s sail structure, is connected to the submarine’s after hatch to permit free passage between the submarine and the DDS while the submarine is underwater and approaching the objective area.
The with the submarine still submerged, the SEALs can exit the DDS and ascend to the surface, bringing with them the equipment and rubber rafts, or they can mount an SDV and travel underwater several miles to their objective area. The number of SEALs carried in a submarine for special operation varies with the mission, duration, target and other factors. One or more SEAL platoons of two officers and 14 enlisted men are normally embarked, plus additional Seals to help with mission planing in the submarine and to handle equipment.
Former SSBNs employed to operate with SEALs have special berthing spaces for about 50 seals. Precision Strike U. S. attack submarines carry Tomahawk Land-Attack Missiles (TLAM), which provide the capability for long-range, precision strike with conventional warheads against shore targets. This combination of stealthy attack submarine and precise, long-range cruise missile has many advantages for national decision makers. First used in combat in the 1991 Gulf War, the TLAM has proven to be a highly effective weapon.
The official Department of Defense report “Conduct of the Persian Gulf War” (1992) states: “The observed accuracy of TLAM, for which unambiguous target imagery is available, met or exceeded the accuracy mission planners predicted. “. When the war began on the night of January 16, 1991, the opening shots were Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from U. S. Navy surface ships in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf. The missiles arrived over the heavily defended Iraqi capital of Baghdad at about the same time as U. S. Air Force f-117 “Stealth” attack planes were the only strike aircraft to operate over Baghdad at night, and TLAMs were the only U. S. weapons to strike the city in day-light during the entire campaign.
Conventional aircraft were not used in strikes against Baghdad and certain other Iraqi targets because of the heavy anti-aircraft defenses. U. S. Navy surface ships and submarines fired 288 land-attack variants of the Tomahawk during the Gulf War. Battleships, cruisers, and destroyers launched 276 of the missiles and 12 were launched form submarines-the USS LOUISVILLE (SSN 724), operating in the Red Sea launched eight missiles and the USS PITTSBURGH (SSN 720), operation in the eastern Mediterranean, launched four missiles.
These launches demonstrated the ability of the submarine to operate as a part of an integrated strike force, with targets and related strike data being communicated to them at sea. In the future military operations submarines will not replace traditional carrier attack aircraft. Rather, submarine and surface ship-launched TLAM strikes will be the vanguard of such attacks, destroying early warning, air-defense, and communications facilities to reduce the threats against manned aircraft. Submarines in particular can reach attack positions without altering or provoking the intended adversary.
Battlegroup Operations Attack submarines are fully integrated into Navy battle group operations. Typically, 2 attack submarines are assigned to each battle group. These submarines participate with the battle group in all pre-deployment operational training and exercises. While operating with the battle group, tactical control or command of the submarines is routinely shifted to amphibious group commanders, battle group commanders, destroyer squadron commanders, or even NATO commanders. Likewise, tactical control of NATO submarines is routinely shifter to U. S. mmanders. Sea Denial Stopping enemy surface ships and submarines form using the sea is an important mission for submarines.
Attack submarines can perform sea denial missions in a variety of scenarios, form general war against a major maritime power, to blockages of enemy ports. Attacks against enemy surface ships or submarines can be part of a war of attrition, where the object is to destroy as much of the opposing naval fleet or merchant shipping as possible, or such attacks can be directed against specific targets.
An example of the attrition campaign was the U. S. bmarine operations against the Imperial Japanese merchant marine in World War II, with U. S. undersea craft sinking more than half of Japan’s merchant vessels, as well as a large number of warships. During the Falklands War in 1982, the sinking of the Argentine cruiser GENERAL BELGRANO by the British nuclear-powered submarine CONQUEROR caused the remainder of the Argentine surface fleet, including its aircraft carrier, to return to port.. There were no further sorties by Argentine surface warships during the conflict because of the demonstrated threat from British nuclear-powered submarines.
The principal U. S. sub weapon for attacking enemy surface ships or submarines is the MK 48 torpedo, with the improved ADCAP variant now entering the service. This is a heavy-weight torpedo, with a long range and a large warhead. Advanced guidance allows it to be used against both surface ships and submarines, with the ability to engage in high-speed, maneuvering targets. Attack submarines also carry anti-ship missiles that can engage enemy surface ships at ranges beyond those of torpedoes.
The Tomahawk Anti-Ship Missile (TSAM), has the range of more than 250 nautical miles and is launched while the submarine is completely submerged. After launch, the missile travels to the surface where the jet engine starts and the missile streaks toward its target. Once launched, the missile has autonomous guidance, making it a “fire and forget” weapon. The Tomahawk can be carried in place of torpedoes and can be launched from torpedo tubes. Half of the submarines in the LOS ANGELES (SSN 688) class are also fitted with 12 vertical tubes that can launch TLAMs and TASMs.
Submarines also carry mines to deny sea areas to enemy surface ships or submarines. Two types of mines are used by submarines, the enCAPsulated TORpedo (CAPTOR) and the Submarine-Launched Mobile Mine (SLMM). The CAPTOR can be used against submarines in deep water, while the SLMM is a torpedo-like weapon that, after being launched by the submarine, can travel several miles to a specific point, where it sinks to the sea floor and activates its mine sensors. It is particularly useful for blockading a harbor or a narrow sea passage.
Fitted at first for torpedo tube launch, the Tomahawk cruise missile has enhanced the effectiveness of the attack submarine fleet. Now capable of firing these missiles form a vertical launch system in the bow, the latest flight of the submarine force’s front line Los Angeles class SSNs has proven very useful in the challenging environment of modern littoral war at sea. during Desert Storm, submarine launched Tomahawks proved their extraordinary effectiveness during the first combat use of the submarine force’s new capability.
Mediterranean submarine operations during the Persian Gulf conflict provides a case in point. With their stealth quiet manner, endurance, diverse weapons array, and ability to detect threats while effectively communicating with the fleet at great range, American submarines conduct both independent tactical and strategic patrols as well as operations in support of carrier battle groups. The effort to integrate the submarines more thoroughly with air and surface forces suggests that naval warfare of the future will require a flexible mix of assets designed for a future filled with constantly changing defense demands.
Always on the cutting edge, the submarine force will help the Navy sustain the adaptability necessary to control tomorrow’s battlespace. Deterrence Just prior to the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in late 1991, the U. S. Navy’s 34 ballistic missile submarines carried some 45% of the almost 12,000 nuclear warheads in the nations strategic offensive forces. The other components of the U. S. Triad of strategic forces, the land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and land-based bombers, carried some 20% and 35% of the warheads, respectively.
The significance of the Navy’s SSBN force was cited by General Colin Powell, U. S. Army, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at a ceremony in April 1992 marking the completion of the 3,000th deterrent patrol. General Colin Powell told the submariners, “But no one-no one- has done more to prevent conflict, no one has made a greater sacrifice for the cause of Peace, than you. America’s proud missile submarine family. You stand tall among all our heroes of the Cold War. ” Strategic deterrence remains a fundamental element of U. S. fense strategy, just as conventional deterrence has become increasingly important since the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Nuclear-powered submarines will be the principal component of the future U. S. strategic posture. Land-based bombers and intercontinental missiles are being reduced; the SSBN force will be the only Triad element still deploying missiles armed with Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry vehicles (MIRVs). The future submarine component of the Triad will consist of 18 modern OHIO (SSBN 726) class SSBNs, each capable of carrying 24 long-range TRIDENT missiles with up to eight warheads per missile.
A review of SSBN warheads is being made by the United States as part of the reduction of strategic weapons directed by the President. Still, the submarine force will provide the overwhelming majority of U. S. strategic weapons – the burden of future strategic nuclear deterrence will be squarely on the submarine force. The United States entered World War I with a total of 24 diesel powered submarines. They did not see a great deal of action, and in the small number of encounters with the enemy they were unable to confirm a single victory.