The Islamic Resistance Movement, commonly known as Hamas, is a Palestinian Islamic fundamentalist movement and terrorist organization whose primary goal is the establishment of an Islamic state in place of Israel. The word Hamas is an acronym for Harakat Al-Muqawama Al-Islamia, the organizations full Arabic name. The Arabic word hamas literally translated means zeal or enthusiasm, although the groups membership interprets it to mean courage and bravery.
The Islamic Resistance Movement is currently the dominant and most active terrorist organization operating in Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip. Hamas became active in the Arab-Israeli conflict around 1987, during the early stages of the intifada (the Palestinian uprising). The movements founder is Sheikh Ahmed Ismail Yassin, a religious leader and high ranking member of the Muslim Brotherhood. He formed Hamas in order to exercise a more active anti-Israeli role and compete with other Palestinian groups for leadership of the uprising.
Sheikh Yassin established Hamas extensive organizational system to direct the political and intifada- related work of the movement. The Muslim Brotherhood of Gaza recruited Hamas original membership hrough its network of social and charity institutions in Gaza and the West Bank. While Hamas identifies itself as a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, there are differences between the two organizations. Both movements call for the creation of a pan-Islamic state founded on sharia (Islamic Law).
The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928, promotes a strategy of first establishing a pan-Islamic state, then launching jihad (holy war) against Israel. Hamas believes that Israel must be destroyed first and an Islamic Palestinian state created in its place. Palestine will then serve as the enter of Arab and Muslim unity, coalescing the Middle East into a single Islamic state. In August 1988, Hamas published its basic ideology in The Charter of Allah: The Platform of the Islamic Resistance Movement, commonly referred to as the Covenant of Hamas.
It is a broad manifesto, mixing Koranic quotations and interpretations of Arab history with Hamas doctrine, exhortations for obedience to Islamic law, condemnations of the West, and calls for jihad against Israel. The movements central goal is the creation of an Islamic state in all of Palestine, from the Mediterranean Sea to the banks f the Jordan River. Hamas considers itself the spearhead and the vanguard of the circle of struggle against World Zionism and believes it is the religious duty of all Muslims to support its movement.
Hamas rejects any peace process or political solution that includes the forfeiture of any part of Palestine or the recognition of Israels right to exist. Hamas began operations in the occupied territories at the beginning of the intifada and played a major part in the escalation of the uprising. Hamas acted independently, refusing to subordinate itself to he leadership of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), and enjoyed wide support of younger Palestinians. Hamas incited and participated in disturbances and demonstrations; published and distributed leaflets; and organized boycotts and strikes.
Many of the intifadas most violent clashes were between the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) and Hamas shock troops, Al-Suad Al-Ramaya (the Throwing Arm). Hamas hit squads, Majmouath Jihad u-Dawa (Holy War and Sermonizing Group), enforced Hamas directives through terror tactics, including the murder of over forty Palestinians for collaborating with Israel. In 1989, Hamas operatives began terrorist attacks aimed at Israeli targets, beginning with the kidnapping and murder of two Israeli soldiers in Gaza.
Since then, Hamas has continued its terrorist attacks against both Palestinians and Israelis using a combination of assassination, ambushes, hostage taking, car bombs, suicide bombers, and drive-by shootings. When the 1991 Madrid peace talks began, Hamas attacks were intended to stop the Arab-Israeli peace process. Following the joint PLO-Israeli Declaration of Principles in 1993 and the implementation of the Oslo Peace Accords, Hamas focused its perations on forcing Israel to abandon the entire the West Bank. In all, Hamas terrorist attacks since 1993 have killed over 200 Israelis.
The Israeli government outlawed Hamas in 1989. Israel has since employed negotiation, counterattacks, assassination, arrests, and deportation in continuing attempts to control or disable the movement. Despite these measures, Hamas continues to be the leading perpetrator of terrorist acts against Israel. Hamas is a cellular organization with some of its elements working openly and others operating clandestinely. Hamas divided Gaza and the West Bank into regions, each having functional frameworks divided into military, security, political, and charitable-social elements.
The movement tries to maintain a clear division between its covert operations, which commit acts of violence, and its overt activities, which recruit members, perform social services, raise money, and distribute propaganda. Hamas military division is the Kataib Izzeddin Al Qassam and includes the terrorist element Al- Majahadoun Al-Falestinioun (Palestinian Holy Fighters). The military division establishes underground ells; collects information on the IDF; conducts commando-style training of recruits; and plans and executes offensive operations.
The Al-Majahadoun Al-Falestinioun is primarily responsible for bombing attacks, to include the indoctrination and equipping of suicide bombers. Shiekh Yassin established the security and intelligence section, Jehaz Aman, in early 1986 to conduct surveillance on suspected Israeli collaborators and Palestinians who fail to follow the principles of Islam. In 1987, the security section created the Majmouath Jihad u-Dawa, hit squads whose purpose was to ill heretics and collaborators. During the course of the intifada, the hit squads took on various names, the current being Iz al-Din al-Kassam.
In addition to surveillance and direct action missions, the security and intelligence section writes and disseminates official communiqus; distributes information newsletters; publicizes Israeli collaborator recruitment policies; and manages Hamas logistics support. Al-Maktab al-Siyassi, the political wing, manages Hamas foreign relations and represents Hamas at conferences that deal with Palestinian affairs. Al-Maktab al-Ilami, the information office, operates openly in Amman, Jordan, and is responsible for preparing and issuing press releases and issuing publications in the movements name.
Hamas shunned the media until 1990, but during the Persian Gulf War the organization realized the importance of using the press to gain international support and now talks openly with western journalists. Hamas works through a wide network of charity organizations, Jamayath Hiriya, and committees, Lejan Zekath. These organizations provide an extensive range of critical social support to Palestinians onsisting of medical clinics, nurseries, schools, and welfare centers.
They also provide Hamas with a respectable front for its clandestine operations which include the transfer of funds from donors to field operatives; liaison with the organizations leadership abroad; and recruitment of new members. The Israelis weakened the centralized leadership of Hamas in May 1989 when they arrested Sheikh Yassin for plotting the kidnapping and deaths of two Israeli soldiers. Hamas has since developed an effective chain of command for day-to-day operations while Yassin allegedly continues to guide the ovements broad strategy.
The senior leaders of Hamas direct and coordinate activities within each of the organizations regions. Shin Bet (Israel’s General Security Service) has identified the movements senior leaders, but Israeli attempts to infiltrate Hamas have been unsuccessful. The movements actual command structure is a well-kept secret. Hamas operates with relative freedom in the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) controlled Gaza Strip and, to a lesser extent, in PNA controlled areas of the West Bank. The movement has representatives in most Arab states and representation in some European cities.
Hamas allegedly has command structures in the United States and United Kingdom where fund raising and operational planning are conducted. The total number of active Hamas members is unknown. Shin Bet estimates that there are 15-20 hard core special operatives active in Gaza. Hamas probably has between 800 and 1,200 active fighters. Throughout the occupied territories there are numerous Muslim activists who sympathize with and assist Hamas, but have limited or no knowledge of its operations. Much of Hamas success is due to a strong system of financial assistance and material support, onated by a variety of sources.
Best estimates place the movements annual budget at $50 million dollars. Hamas receives about one-third of its money from charitable fund raising conducted through Palestinian nationalist groups in Europe, Canada, and the United States. Among Arab states, Syria, Jordan, the Sudan, Iran, and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Jordan are all Hamas contributors. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states cut financial support to the PLO when Yassar Arafat supported Saddam Husseins invasion of Kuwait. They transferred most of this money to Hamas, which condemned
Iraqs aggression, on the condition that Hamas limit its use of the money to expanding its infrastructure only within the occupied territories. While they want to encourage action against Israel, the Persian Gulf monarchies do not want an upsurge of Islamic fundamentalism in their own countries. King Hussein ibn Talil of Jordan allows Hamas non-military wings to operate openly in his country. Hussein renounced Jordans claim to the West Bank in 1988 in favor of the Palestinians and signed a peace agreement with Israel in 1994. The king sees support of Hamas as one way to maintain his nfluence in the West Bank.
Iran is one of Hamas most enthusiastic supporters. In October 1992, the Iranian government recognized Hamas as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian jihad and agreed to allow Hamas to establish an office and radio station in Tehran. In addition to money, Irans logistics aid includes training for Hamas fighters conducted by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard. While Hamas works well with the Arab states, it has an adversarial relationship with the Palestinian National Authority. Part of this is due to ideological differences.
The PNA is a secular rganization that has adopted a conservative approach in working towards an independent Palestine — the antithesis of Hamas fundamentalist creed and reliance on terrorism. The PNA is also responsible for maintaining order in the self rule zones and, in keeping with its promises to Israel, must at least attempt to control terrorism. Hamas bases in those areas and their continued attacks against Israeli targets have forced the PNA to arrest, imprison and deport thousands of Hamas activists and supporters. Many Israelis and Americans charge that Yassar Arafat could do more to control Hamas.
Most of those arrested by the PNA Security forces are members of the Hamas political wing, while known members of the military divisions remain free. When key members of Hamas are brought to trial in PNA courts, they regularly receive light sentences. Off the record, Arafats aides say he worries that increased pressure against Hamas will result in increased Hamas attacks against Israeli targets. This would weaken his credibility with the Israeli government and slow the expansion of Palestinian self rule. Arafat may also fear the possibility that Hamas might lead a Palestinian civil war.
Hamas and the PNA have conducted negotiations. At Yassar Arafats request, Hamas agreed to cease fires in April and October 1995. Hamas broke the April cease fire with three suicide bomb attacks when Israel failed to meet a July Oslo Accord deadline for expanded Palestinian control of the West Bank. The October cease fire, declared in preparation for Palestinian elections, ended in February when Hamas launched four bombing attacks. These strikes were in retaliation for the Shin Bet assassination of Yahya Ayyash, a Hamas bomb-maker and leader among the Al-Majahadoun Al-Falestinioun.
Hamas intended to participate in the January 1996 Palestinian Council elections, but opted to boycott instead. Hamas did not prohibit its members from participating as independents, but could not participate as an organization. Running for Council office required renouncing the armed struggle against Israel. Hamas wants to claim its share of power in the Palestinian government, but it is ideologically impossible for Hamas to grant its approval of the peace process. While it has avoided direct involvement in the Palestinian National Authority, Hamas has worked ard to develop a strong base of support among the Palestinian people.
They see popular support is a key element in establishing the Islamic Palestinian state. Hamas established the best social service network in the Gaza Strip. It has participated in non-PNA sponsored elections in trade unions, chambers of commerce, agricultural cooperatives, and at universities. Hamas controls many Gazan political, religious, and social organizations, but the movement does not seem to have hard-core support. Popularity seems to be tied to the prospects for peace and autonomy. In the fall of 1994, Hamas conducted a series of bus bombings to avenge the deaths of twenty-nine Palestinians murdered by an Israeli settler in Hebron.
Opinion polls conducted by the Palestinian Center for Research in Nablus, the West Bank, show that Palestinian support for Hamas in November 1994 was 57%, reflecting approval of Hamas revenge. Following the signing of the Oslo Peace Accords and the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza, Palestinians began to hope for a peaceful transition to independence. In February and March 1996, Hamas executed four suicide bomb attacks in retaliation for he death of Yahya Ayyash. Its approval rating in that month was barely 10%.
At that point in time, the general perception among Palestinians was that Hamas program of terrorism was an impediment to the peace process. Public opinion changed again in the last year. In March 1997, Hamas candidates soundly defeated Arafat backed PLO candidates in a series of Palestinian university student government elections. Hamas supporters now control the student councils of all Palestinian colleges and universities in Gaza and the West Bank. Many students voted for Hamas because of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahus ecision to build an Israeli settlement at Har Homa.
These students believe that Netanyahus actions vindicate Hamas views on the Oslo Peace Accords. As long as the Israeli government continues to stall on the complete implementation of the Oslo Peace Accords, Palestinian support for Hamas will grow stronger, while faith in Yassar Arafat and the peace process will weaken. The danger to Hamas is that Arafats Palestinian Council might not be able to maintain a level of law and order acceptable to Israeli. Chaos in the self rule areas might cause the Israelis to reoccupy all of the West Bank and Gaza.
