The Peloponnesian War shook the Greek world so forcefully that Thucydides believed “it would be a great war, and more worthy of relation than any that had preceded it”. It spanned nearly thirty years, as Sparta and Athens grappled for power over the Greek world. Its length can be traced to many factors, however, for the sake of brevity, I have narrowed it down to three main reasons. Firstly, Sparta and Athens underestimated each other and overestimated themselves.
Secondly, Athens and Sparta were two distinctly different poleis whose identities shaped their respective battle strategies, which left them at a military stalemate for the Archidamian War and the Peace Nicias. And thirdly, the Peace of Nicias, peace being a loose term in this case, did little to resolve the points of conflict from the first portion of the war, inevitably leading to the Decelean-lonian War. Coming down from the Persian Wars, Athens established itself as a formidable naval force in the Greek world.
The fear of Persian return drove Athens to seek alliances, forming the Delian League. The momentum generated from its successes in the Persian Wars enabled Athens to slowly transition into an empire. According to Thucydides, “[the Lacedaemonians] feared the growth of the power of the Athenians, seeing most of Hellas already subject to them”. In particular, the Spartans were wary of Athens’ naval aptitude, public and private wealth, population numbers, and tributary allies. The Athenians, on the other hand, wanted to establish its empire as an equal, if not a superior, to Sparta.
When Pericles rallied for Athenian boldness and strength, he proclaimed “[the Lacedaemonians) must treat you more as equals”. With these motivations in tow, both sides presented their strengths to their assemblies, telling why they should go to war, overselling why they would win. A Corinthhian, ally to Sparta, opens with ‘We have many reasons to expect success… “, proceeding to cite Sparta’s superior military strength and discipline, denouncing Athens’ navy because of its reliance on funds versus men. Pericles focused on Sparta’s lack of funds and experience at sea, as well as their requiring to be close to home for farming.
He mentions “they are incapacitated from carrying on a war against a power different in character fr their own… “, confident that Sparta would be unable to cope with Athens/ naval strength. In addition, Sparta and Athens were two very different poleis. Athens accumulated wealth through tribute and trading; its government was a democracy and it boasted naval strength. Sparta, in contrast, avoided commercial interests and was a military state with the best, bred, hoplite soldiers. Spartan and Athenian motivations for fighting as well as these distinct characteristics. argely determined how their battle strategies unfolded, during the Archidamian War, from 431 to 421 BC, and why the war lasted the time that it did. Spartan and Athenian strengths were the antitheses of each other. The Spartans were superior in land military, with their hoplites, while Athenians dominated with their navy. Their military methodologies accentuated their strengths. The Spartans opted for a series of offensive invasions into Athenian farmlands, ravaging along the way. The Athenians, listening to Pericles, took a defensive stance and focused on preserving the polis.
On Pericles’ part, this was smart, as Athenian power relied on its navy and funds, both of which were tied to the polis, housing its treasury and ports. The Spartans routinely ravaged Athenian farmlands in 430, 428, and 421 BC, while the Athenians continued to retreat to the polis, avoiding hoplite battles. This military theme is pervasive throughout the Peloponnesian War and was a result of Sparta underestimating Athens’ patience and ability to remain selfsufficient within its city walls.
In doing this, they wasted time avaging surrounding farmland, hoping the Athenians would cow, prolonging the Peloponnesian War. In addition, there was the Battle of Sphacteria where Athens defeated Sparta on land; the Battle of Amphipolis, in which the Spartans defeated the Athenians on land; the Battle of Pylos, a naval victory for Athens. Other spats occurred vicariously through allies, such as the Mytilene Revolt against Athens in 428/7 BC, during which the Spartans promised to send Mytilene aid, though they fail to do so, they did it in hopes of depriving Athens of a tributary ally.
The point of this listing, is to demonstrate how mixed the results were of the first portion of the war. With one opponent being hoplite offensive and the other naval defensive, the first portion of the Peloponnesian War was rather murky, as to who was really winning. While the ravaging of Athenian farmland did hurt Athens, it did not subdue her, as the Spartans believed it would. And while the Athenians did preserve Athens with their defensive strategy, they suffered multiple scourges of plague, losing a number of Athenian citizens, in the process.
Additionally, Athens was simultaneously preoccupied with other endeavors, chipping away at the Corinthian empire. Eventually, both Athens and Sparta grew weary of fighting and agreed to the tenuous Peace of Nicias that lasted from 421-414 BC. While the peace was much desired by both sides, it did little to end the fighting between Sparta, Athens and their allies, leaving them at peace on paper, but not in spirit. In essence, the Peloponnesian War was still ongoing, with no change in battle tactics. The Peace of Nicias was an ineffective peace treaty, in which neither side was effectively subdued to the will of the other.
While the treaty could be construed as an Athenian victory, I believe victory is too strong of a word, considering neither side fully adhered to treaty terms. The treaty stipulated: both sides were not to fight each other, most of captured land would be restored, and prisoners would be returned. If anything, the Peace of Nicias was a passive aggressive extension of the Archidamian War, during which neither side changed their tactics, retained all tensions and continued to face each other in battle. The peace was meant to last 50 years, it barely lasted eight.
During those eight years, Athenian and Spartan troops faced each other at Matinea and Athens joined the Argive League, the prime enemy of Sparta. In addition, not all of the combatants’ respective allies signed the treaty, indicating the lack of consensus and resolution from the Archidamian War. But perhaps most importantly, Athens goes on its Sicilian Expedition, leading to the turning point of the war. The Athenians decided to go to Sicily after its Segestan allies asked for help in disputes with neighboring cities Selinus and Syracuse. The request piqued Athens’ imperial interest and she decided to send assistance.
The campaign ends in disaster after Sparta decided to aid Syracuse, against Athens. In a devastating blow, combined Spartan and Syracusan forces defeated Athens by land and sea, forcing the Athenians to retreat, until they were then captured and massacred. In the case of the Sicilian Expedition, the Athenians underestimated the difficulties they would face in Sicily, similar to Spartan mistakes from the Archidamian War. This time they put too much faith in their allies in the region and stalled too long, at a critical moment of battle, giving the Syracusans time to call on Sparta for help.
The Sicilian Expedition also represented the beginning of Athens’ decline in the Peloponnesian War. After a brutal defeat, Athens was unable to replenish its losses in time for the second half of the Peloponnesian War, the Decelean-lonian War. The Peace of Nicias was so soft as a treatise, it is hard to trace exactly when the Decelean-lonian War began. However, formal peace clearly ended when Spartan King Agis invaded Attica in spring of 413. As the Greek world progresses through the Decelean-lonian War, primary sources, as well as secondary sources, become scarce, making it difficult to assess the specifics of 414-404 BC.
Thucydides only dedicates one of eight books from his History of the Peloponnesian Wars, to the Decelean-lonian War. Even then, what he does document does not cover it, in its entirety. Xenophon’s continuation of Thucydides’ work only has two, significantly shorter, books covering the time period. However, the information gleaned is as follows. There was a stark difference between the first two thirds of the Peloponnesian War and last Decelean-lonian war, due to the new involvement of the Persians, in 412 BC.
The Spartans recognized that their present strategy was not effective and decided to adjust their tactics. Firstly, the Spartans set up a base in Decelea, on Attica, not far from Athens, allowing for a closer base from which to launch attacks. Secondly, and more importantly, the Spartans made an alliance with the Persians. This revolutionized Sparta’s military strategy because an alliance with Persia came with Persian ships and monetary backing, giving Sparta the strength it needed to defeat Athens. The decision was critical to Sparta’s success however, it came at no small cost.
The Persian Wars ended in 449 BC, just 37 years before this alliance. Sparta asking an old enemy for aid would have been a very difficult decision to make. Yet, it demonstrates just how serious Sparta was about defeating Athens which, during this period, was experiencing an oligarchical revolution. According to Thucydides, the oligarchs were initially quite successful as “it was during the first period of this constitution that the Athenians appear to have enjoyed the best government that they ever did, at least in my time. “.
While Athens had a promising victory at Cyzicus and restores her democracy, after being on the brink of civil war, she ultimately falls to Sparta at sea, during the Battle of Aigos Potamos, in 404 BC. Sparta forced Athens to remove her walls and replaced her democracy with a thirty person oligarchy. Although Sparta had the official victory and rectified its weaknesses from the prolonged the Archidamian War and Peace of Nicias, it never regained its original power; similarly, Athens manages to reinstate its democracy, again, but never reclaims the empire it once had.
Sparta fought for the reminiscent days of her supreme hoplite warfare and Athens for her growing naval empire. These two facets of the Greek world simply could not coexist with the ambitions they had. The struggle between these two incompatible powers was the reason the Peloponnesian War lasted so long. Their incompatibilities, rooted in different political and economic characteristics, shaped their military strengths and strategies, leading to an inconclusive first installment of the war.
The earlier parts of the Peace of Nicias, led to no resolution, maintained the same tensions from the beginning of the war, with no drastic change in military strat stretching out battles, just like the Archidmian War. The Sicilian Expedition weakened Athens to a significant degree however, Sparta’s alliance with Persia solidified her victory, mitigating the deficiencies of Sparta’s monetary and naval assets. While Sparta had the final victory, the Peloponnesian War ultimately represents the slow decline of both Athens and Sparta, as neither party reclaimed its former glory and would soon answer to the impending Macedonians.
