The “2nd U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals” held that those business practices that have had a disparate impact effect on the older workers are now considered to be actionable under one national anti-discrimination law (Hamblett, 2004). The case does reaffirm a second Circuit precedent that had been set but which is at odds with what a majority of federal courts have held. The appeals court supported the idea that a layoff plan had been properly brought under the The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) although the company did not have the intention of discriminating.
The case Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory did in fact uphold the jury’s findings that employees who are on the older side had lost their jobs through a layoff plan. This discrimination was unintentional. However, the policy did have an impact that was deemed discriminatory and the firm could have reached its goals through a different method that would not effectively discriminate. The reason for the suit had to do with the fact that thirty of thirty-one people who were laid off were over the age of forty. There were 26 plaintiffs who did go to trial while some of the others settled with the company on their own.
In the end, the jury awarded plaintiffs a total award of $4. 2. The case was appealed and at the time, Knolls argued that the law really does not allow disparate impact claims, citing Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U. S. 604 (1993), where a claim involved disparate treatment and what was needed was proof of intentional discrimination. The Court claims that the Hazen Paper Court had not resolved the appropriate use of ADEA in terms of disparate impact. It was further stated that the decisions to come from other circuits do not necessarily overrule prior cases.
The idea that disparate impact claims may not be allowed under ADEA is therefore rejected. It seems that the major issue here is whether or not one can use age as a factor in terms of discrimination when the discrimination was not intentional. If for example it turns out that the people who are laid off are over the age of 40, even though no malicious intent is discovered, it still may be construed as age discrimination. This issue has been somewhat controversial for some time, as most litigants in age discrimination lawsuits realize that they will likely need some proof that a discriminatory practice had occurred.
At the same time, it seems that if almost all individuals laid off were older than the rest of the company, disaffirmation seems to have occurred. The court agrees as evidenced by this case. The ruling of the court reasoned that if in fact so many older individuals got the brunt of company policy, then in fact they were effectively discriminated against. This is true even though there was no malice or intent to dismiss older individuals. Historically, there have been charges that individuals are let go because they cost the company more in terms of salary and benefits.
Yet, it is difficult to prove. This case provides an example that renders proof of discrimination somewhat easier. At the age of 30, I have yet to be discriminated against due to my age. This case protects certain applicants and employees 40 years of age and older from discrimination on the basis of age in hiring, promotion, discharge, compensation, or terms, conditions or privileges of employment. RAYTHEON CO. v. HERNANDEZ In a 2003 case, an employee tested positive for drugs and in this case it was Cocaine (“Supreme,” 2003).
He then admitted that the behavior he engaged in violated workplace rules and he was made to resign. Two years after the incident, he tried to get rehired, and he stated that he is in recovery and is a member of AA and so forth. He was denied employment because the organization has a policy of not rehiring people who had engaged n workplace misconduct in the past (2003). The respondent filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), suggesting that he was indeed the subject of a discriminatory practice due to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA).
The EEOC did issue a “right-to-sue letter, ” and so the respondent did file the ADA action, and argued that the petitioner rejected his application due to his “drug addition and/or because he was regarded as being a drug addict”. Although the employer had a “neutral no-rehire policy,” and it had nothing to do with drug abuse, it did violate ADA due to the policy’s “disparate impact”. In this case, the district court did grant the petitioner’s motion for a summary judgment in respect to disparate treatment and did ultimately find that the claim had not been implemented on a timely basis (“Supreme,” 2003).
The Ninth Circuit did also agree to the existence of a disparate-impact claim, but it also held that the disparate-treatment claim had proffered a prima facie case related to discrimination. The petitioner had not in fact met its burden, which was to provide a legitimate reason for employment action due to its no-rehire policy. While the action is lawful, at least at face value, it is deemed to be unlawful as it is applied to employees who are legally forced to resign for the use of illegal drugs when they are later rehabilitated.
The court held that the Ninth Circuit did improperly apply an analysis to the respondent’s claim of disparate-treatment. This Court has further consistently made a distinction between the claims of disparate-treatment and disparate-impact. The former aspect had come to fruition when an employer would treat an individual less favorably than others due to a protected characteristic. The liability of the claim would thus depend upon whether or not the protected trait would truly motivate an employer’s action. In this case, the respondent had been limited to disparate-treatment theory as the petitioner would not rehire him based on a disability.
As a “matter of law,” the Court concluded that the policy administered at the place of business was not legitimate. The major issue in this case was whether or not a place of business has the right to support a no-rehire policy that inadvertently discriminates against those with substance abuse problems. The fact that such problems are covered by ADA renders such a blanket policy illegal. The ruling of the court and the reasoning went to the fact that even though the business did not purposely discriminate, it did in fact due to a policy that is discriminatory in nature.
In other words, the true reason for the firing was directly related to substance abuse. Although the employee was technically not let go due to the abuse specifically, the fact that this occurred in fact is enough to render the policy unfair. I feel that this law provides great value to my workplace as, it protects those who have made mistakes at the workplace due to a disability. In this case it was substance abuse, but the same concept could be applied to other conditions that alter behavior.
