Operation Gothic Serpent (OGS), the manhunt for Mohamed Farrah Aidid (MFA), leader of the Somali National Alliance (SNA), commenced on 3 October 1993 and ended on 4 October 1993. Task Force Ranger’s (TFR) mission targeted the so-called Black Sea slum district, near the Bakara Market, to capture two of MFA’s key lieutenants near the Olympic Hotel. On the afternoon of 3 October 1993, Helicopters carrying assault and blocking forces launched around 1530 from the task force compound at the western end of Mogadishu airport, with a ground convoy moving out three minutes later.
The mission would later be called the Battle for Mogadishu. The assault team captured 22 Somalis in the raid. With the downing of 2 MH-60 helicopters due to RPG-fire, the mission transformed from manhunting to rescue and recovery. However, casualties were heavy and TER lost 16 soldiers on between 3 and 4 October, and had another 57 wounded, with 1 other killed and 12 wounded on 6 October by a mortar attack on their hangar complex at the airport.
The 2-14th Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, suffered 2 Americans killed and 22 wounded, while the Malaysian coalition partners had 2 killed and 7 wounded and the Pakistanis suffered 2 wounded. Various estimates placed Somali casualties between 500 and 1,500. This paper evaluates OGS by providing a brief summary of the case study (Battle for Mogadishu), providing context, and setting the stage for analysis. This paper further examines why this topic fits the parameters for a special operation and explains the strategic or operational impact of OGS.
Finally, this paper analyzes the degree to which OGS demonstrates the appropriate application and/or integration of Special Operations Forces (SOF) to achieve military or political objectives. TFR deployment on 22 August 1993 to Somalia was in direct support of a United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) request by the Secretary General, Special Representative, U. S. Navy Admiral Jonathan Howe. On 17 June 1993, Howe issued a $25K warrant for information leading to the apprehension of MFA.
UNOSOM II was established by United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 814 (26 March 1993) with the purpose of taking over United Nations (UN) operations in Somalia from the UN unified task force or UNITAF (UNSCR 733 and 746 created UNOSOM I – first stability mission in Somalia after the dissolution of a Somali central government circa 3 December 1992). Operation Restore Hope was the U. S. mission to support humanitarian aid to Somalia – the tasking was to assure security until humanitarian relief efforts could be transferred to the UN. The UNITAF had a fourphased plan to transfer operations to UNOSOM II.
Phase | – deployment and security of ports, airfields, and roads in Mogadishu; Phase II – expansion of the security zone to surrounding regions in southern Somalia; Phase III – expansion into Kismaayo (southwest facing the Indian Ocean), Bardera (northwest and inland toward the Kenya border), and maintain road networks for humanitarian operations throughout the southern zone, and Phase IV – handover operations to the UN and withdraw most of UNITAF forces. UNOSOM II would not formally take over operations in Somalia until UNITAF dissolved on 4 May 1993).
UNOSOM I had brokered a federalist government based on 18 autonomous regions agreed to by Somalia’s armed factions. The primary objective was to support the new system, initiate nation-building in Somalia to disarm various factions, restore law and order, setup a representative government, and restore key infrastructure. UNOSOM II had approximately 28K troops and 2. 8K logistics and civilian staff (coalition consisted of 30 countries to include the U. S. ) to accomplish the UN-led mission. The U. S. provided a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) of approximately 1,200 troops stationed n Navy Ships (composition as part of Carrier Strike Group – 6).
The U. S. Joint Task Force Somalia supported the UNOSOM IL mission with approximately 17,700 troops. The QRF would respond to emergency threats against UNOSOM II forces but would require Commander-in-Chief (CINC), Central Command (CENTCOM) approval. The watershed event occurred on 5 June 1993, when Pakistani forces conducted an investigation into an alleged arms depot belonging to Somali warlords vying for the presidency. 24 Pakistani troops were killed, 44 Pakistanis were wounded. The attacking Somalis were associated with MFA.
On 6 June 1993, UNSCR 837 declared that the UN would take all necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks and to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM I throughout Somalia. UNOSOM II now targeted MFA from this point forward for apprehension. OGS fits the parameters for a special operations mission because it meets the tenets of the five SOF truths – 1) Humans are more important than hardware; 2) Quality is better than quantity; 3) SOF cannot be mass produced; 4) Competent SOF cannot be created after emergencies occur; and, 5) Most special operations require nonSOF assistance.
TFR was a relatively small Joint Special Operations Task Force (SOTF) compared to the over 45,000 General Purpose Forces (GPF) deployed in Somalia circa October 1993. The JSOTF consisted of single-purpose forces designed to apprehend MFA through intelligence-driven manhunting military operations. TFR was organized around the assault squadron, with light infantry security, special tactics and para-rescuemen, sniper/observer teams, and supporting aviation assets designed to work as a combined arms team. TFR was not self-sufficient; it still required support from the U. S. ed Joint Task Force in Somalia when conducting operations in UNOSOM II’s battlespace.
TER reported directly to CINCCENT (GEN Joseph Hoar) and not to the American Commander of U. S. Forces in Somalia. This is doctrine for command and control (C2) of SOF forces assigned to USSOCOM. The TER Commander, MG William Garrison, still had the responsibility to coordinate and deconflict operations with the Deputy UNOSOM II Commander, MG Thomas Montgomery (dual-hatted as the Commander of U. S. Forces in Somalia). TER deployed a Joint Special Operations Task Force (ISOTF) of approximately 400 personnel.
In the sixth previous missions to apprehend MFA (combination of day/night helicopter and ground convoy assaults), TER came under increasing small arms fire to include rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs). On 21 September 1993, TER captured MFA adviser and financier Osman Ali Atto. However, more telling of things to come, on 25 September 1993, a UH-60 Blackhawk helicopter from the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) was hit by RPG-fire that resulted in the death of 3 crew members near New Port, just south of Mogadishu.
Since UNOSOM II was actively targeting MFA, SNA armed factions had increasingly employed RPGs as a weapon to combat aircraft which likely provided a psychological boost. The mentality of the Somali people at that time was us against them as the populace blamed the U. S. for Somali casualties as a result of the hunt for MFA even before TE Ranger had closed on Mogadishu on 28 August 1993. The strategic impact of OGS was that on 7 October 1993, the POTUS, in a televised address to the American people, stated that the proactive policy in Somalia would end and withdrawal of U. S. forces would happen not later than 31 March 1994.
The address came days after news footage from Mogadishu showed dead American service members bodies being dragged through the streets. The POTUS decision to redeploy U. S. military forces from Somalia after heavy casualties during the Battle of Mogadishu would send a message to enemies of the U. S. that the U. S. had no stomach for fighting. This would be a lesson drawn by future Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) that actively opposed the U. S. o include but not limited to Al Qaeda.
TER was the right force to conduct manhunting military operations in Somalia; however, it did not appreciate the tactical changes made by the SNA and other armed factions during the period of June through September 1993. Warlords, clans, and sub-clans were actively pursuing countermeasures to neutralize the technological superiority of American forces. This also included warlords using the populace to actively support militia activities in the name of religion.
The operational environment had changed since June, and the Battle for Mogadishu would provide valuable lessons learned for the integration of the JSOTE with UNOSOM II and the American Joint Task Force. In August 1993, MG Montgomery requested a mechanized task force, an air cavalry troop, and increased human intelligence assets. This request was ultimately denied by the Secretary of Defense (Les Aspin) as it was thought to send the wrong message; the U. S. was reducing its footprint in Somalia, not increasing it.
TER would have been more effective if it utilized dedicated QRF from the Joint Task Force. GPF assets would likely be used as cordon forces to secure key blocking positions that isolated the objective (outer cordon while the light infantry secured the inner cordon). Furthermore, a robust cordon force would support TFR exfiltration out of the objective area with security. However, in the final analysis, TFR did not achieve its primary objective, the capture of MFA. Its mission was cut short by the POTUS, which would have unintended consequences with respect to how adversaries viewed the U. S. military.
