What are the tasks of knowledge of the soul puts Aristotle?
First of all, it is necessary to determine to what kind of (existing) soul and what it is; is it a definite thing; Does it relate to what exists in the opportunity? or rather, there is some entelechy (Greek entelechia – having a goal in itself) – in Aristotle – purposefulness, purposefulness as a driving force).
It is also necessary to find out whether the soul consists of parts or not and whether all souls are homogeneous or not. And eating is not homogeneous, then whether they differ from each other in appearance or genus. This needs to be clarified because those who talk about the soul and investigate it, consider, apparently, only the human soul. neither should the definition of the soul be one such as. For example, the definition of a living being is one, or the soul of each race has a special definition, such as the soul of a horse, a dog, a man, God (as a living being as a general is either something or a subsequent one, the same is true of any other community. )
Further, if there is not a multitude of souls, but only parts of the soul, then the question arises: should we first examine the whole soul or its parts? it is also difficult with respect to parts to determine which of them differ in nature and whether it is necessary to first examine parts or the types of their activities (for example, thinking or mind, sensation or the ability of sensation). And in the same way with respect to other soul abilities. If, however, it is necessary first to investigate the types of its activity, then again it would be possible to raise the question of whether it is necessary to first consider what is opposed to them, for example: the senses of sensation that is sensed before, the conceivable before thinking powers.
What is the ratio of soul and movement?
Aristotle understood the soul as the motivating principle, but argued that the soul itself could not move.
Aristotle distinguished four types of movement (change):
(1.) the emergence and destruction;
(2) qualitative change, i.e. property change;
(3) quantitative change, i.e. increase and decrease (increase, decrease);
(4) moving, changing places.
Actually, it refers to the movement changes of the form (2) – (4), because the change of the form (1) is rather just a dimension, consisting in the transition of one thing to another. Meanwhile, the philosopher asserts, occurrence and annihilation are committed relative to the essence; for her, Unet of motion, since nothing that exists does not oppose her.
Since there are four types of movements, the soul must have either one of these movements, or several, or all. If the soul does not move in a proper way, then the movement must be inherent in it by nature, and if it is a movement, then the place: after all, all the movements mentioned occur in a place. But if the essence of the soul lies in the fact that it moves itself, then the movement will not be inherent in its own way.
If the movement is inherent in the soul from nature, then it could be set in motion by extraneous force, and if by extraneous force, then by nature. The same is true of peace. After all, where a thing tends by nature, in the same place it by nature is at rest. And in the same way: where a thing moves under the influence of an extraneous force, in the same place it is at rest under the action of an extraneous force. Aristotle could not accurately explain the movement of the soul in a state of rest under the influence of extraneous force.
We say that the soul is grieving, rejoicing, daring, experiencing fear, further, that she is angry, feels, reflects. It all seems like movements. And therefore one might think that the soul itself is moving. But this is not at all necessary. After all, if to grieve, to rejoice, to ponder is just movement, and all this means to be set in motion, then such a movement is caused by the soul (for example, anger or fear – because the heart starts moving; , it means such a movement of the heart or something else, and in some cases there is a movement, in others – transformations).
Meanwhile, to say that the soul is angry is the same. what to say, the soul weaves or builds a house. After all, it is better, perhaps not to speak. that the soul sympathizes, or learns or meditates. And this does not mean that the movement is in the soul. but it means that it comes to it, then comes from it; so, the perception of such things comes to her. and memory – from the soul to the movements or to their remnants in the senses.
From the foregoing it is obvious that the soul cannot move. And if she does not move at all, then it is clear that she cannot move herself.
What is the ratio of soul and physicality?
The soul is a reason like where the movement is from, as a goal and as the essence of animate bodies.
The essence is, firstly, the matter, which in itself is not a definite thing; secondly, the form or image by which it is already called a definite something, and, thirdly, that which consists of matter and form. Matter is an opportunity, the form is entelechy, and in a twofold sense, in the same way as knowledge. and in that. as an activity of contemplation.
apparently, mainly bodies, and, moreover, natural essences of essence, for they are the beginnings of all other bodies. Of the natural bodies, some are endowed, others are not. We call life all nourishment, growth and decay of the body, having a basis in it. Thus, every natural body, the sacrament of life, is the essence, and the essence is composite.
But although it is such a body, i.e. endowed with life, it cannot be a soul. After all, the body is something belonging to the substrate, but rather itself is a substrate and matter. Thus, the soul must be an entity in the sense of the form of a natural body, having life in possibility. The essence (as a form) is entelechy; therefore the soul is the entelechy of such a body.
Entelechy has a double meaning: either such as knowledge, or such as the activity of contemplation; it is clear that the soul is entelechy in the sense of knowledge. Indeed, because of the presence of the soul, there are both sleep and wakefulness, moreover, wakefulness is similar to the activity of contemplation, the dream is with possession, but without action. For the same person, knowledge of its origin precedes the activity of contemplation.
That is why the soul is the first entelechy of the natural body, having life in possibility. And such a body can only be a body with organs. Therefore, one should not ask whether the soul and the body are one thing, how one should not ask about any matter and what matter it is. Indeed, although the one and being have different meanings, but entelechy is one and being in the proper sense.
The soul is the essence of being and the form (logos) of the natural body, which in itself has the beginning of movement and rest. This should be considered in relation to parts of the body. What has been said about the part of the body should be applied to the whole living body. As a part refers to a part, so in a similar way the totality of sensations refers to the whole sensing body as sensory.
But living in opportunity is not that. what is devoid of soul, but what it possesses. Just as the pupil and sight constitute the eye, so the soul and the body constitute the living entity.
The soul is inseparable from the body; it is also clear that any part of it is inseparable if the soul has parts by nature, for some parts of the soul are the entelechy of bodily parts. But of course, nothing prevents that some parts of the soul are separable from the body, since they are not the entelechy of any body in the same sense in which the shipwright is the entelechy of the vessel.
A person who occupies a higher place in nature differs from other animals in the presence of the mind (rational soul). And the structure of his soul, and the structure of the body correspond to this higher position. It affects upright posture, the presence of organs of labor and speech, in the greatest ratio of brain volume to body, in the abundance of life heat, etc. knowledge is the activity of the sentient and rational soul of man. Sensation or perception is the change that is made by the perceived body in the soul through the medium of the body of the perceiver.
What kind of being is the soul?
Aristotle defined the soul as the First Entelechy of the Organic Body, i.e. the vital principle of the body, which moves it and builds it as its instrument. Therefore, the expedient activity of nature is most clearly revealed in living bodies. According to its functions, the soul is divided into three genders. The function of nutrition and reproduction, cash from any living creature, form a nutritious, or vegetable, soul. Feeling and movement peculiar to animals. form the soul feeling, or animal. Finally, thinking is carried out as the activity of the rational soul – it belongs to man. The law here is this: higher functions, and accordingly souls, cannot exist without lower ones, whereas the latter without the first ones can.
What parts of the soul does Aristotle distinguish?
The soul is distinguished by its vegetative ability, the ability of sensation, the ability of thinking and movement. And whether each of these abilities is a soul or a part of a soul, and if it is a part of the soul, then it is so that each is separable only mentally or also spatially – some of these questions are not difficult to answer, while others cause difficulties. Just like with some plants, if they are cut, parts continue to live separately from each other, as if in each such plant there is one soul in reality (entelechy), and in possibility there are many, just as we see that something like occurs in insects dissected into parts and in relation to other distinctive properties of the soul. Namely: each of the parts has a sensation and the ability to move in space; and if there is a sensation, then there is aspiration. After all, where there is a feeling, there is both sadness and joy, and where they are, there must also be a desire.
Regarding the mind and the capacity for speculation, there is still no evidence, but it seems that they are a different kind of soul and that only these abilities can exist separately, as the eternal – apart from the transitory.
As for the other parts of the soul from what has been said, it is obvious that they cannot be separated from each other.
What abilities does the soul have?
The soul has a vegetative ability, the ability of sensation, the ability of thinking and spatial movement.
Plants have only plant ability, other creatures have this ability, and the ability to feel; and if the ability is sensation, then the ability is aspiration. After all, aspiration is desire, passion and will; all animals have at least one sense – touch. And to whom sensation is inherent; it is also inherent in experiencing pleasure and sadness, and pleasant and painful, and to whom all this is inherent, desire is also inherent: after all, desire is the desire for something pleasant.
What is entelechy?
Entelechy (Greek entelecheia – having a goal in itself) – in Aristotle – purposefulness, purposefulness as a driving force (Teleology (Greek teleos – target, logos – teaching) – each object of nature has an internal cause, which is the source of movement from lower forms to supreme (Aristotle)), an end in itself, an active principle that turns a possibility into reality.
Aristotelian concept of entelechy can be explained as follows. Things exist either entelehichno, as something realized and completed, or potentially, in possibility, or both potentially, and entelechially. The question of motion relates to the third relation: in the mover there is both an opportunity, an ability to change, and an internal tendency to end, i.e. a goal embedded in the thing itself and serving as its internal driving force, since it is capable of change.
And therefore, every phenomenon implies, according to Aristotle, the possibility of change, the goal towards which change is directed, and entelechy as the realization of this goal, lying in the thing.
In other words, entelechy is UprogrammaF change. If for bodies created by art. Target and UprogrammaF lie outside the item being changed and are entered into it by the master. then in natural things they are in it to the extent that the thing has in itself the Primordial of the movement, i.e. capable of self-motion.
