FACTS: The plaintiffs, five abortion clinics, a class of physicians who provided abortion services, and one physician representing himself independently, challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982 which they argued were unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade, in which it was decided that abortion is a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The provisions challenged were the required informed consent, the 24 hour waiting period prior to the procedure, the requirement that a minor seeking an abortion must obtain consent, and the equirement that a married woman must indicate that she notified her husband of her intention to have an abortion. The District Court held that all of the provisions were unconstitutional. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit both affirmed and reversed the District Court’s decision; it held that all of the regulations except for the husband notification requirement were constitutional.
ISSUE: Is it constitutional to require women who wish to undergo an abortion to obtain informed consent, wait 24 hours after being provided with certain information by her doctor, if a minor, to obtain parental onsent, and, if married, to sign a statement indicating that she has notified her husband of her intended abortion; is it constitutional to have reporting and record keeping mandates imposed upon facilities that provide abortion services?
REASONING: O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter: After considering the case of Roe v. Wade, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and the rule of stare decisis, we conclude that the essential holding of Roe v. Wade must be retained and reaffirmed. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment declares that no State shall “deprive any person of.. liberty.. without due process of law. ” There is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not infringe upon.
We reject the trimester framework established under Roe v. Wade because it is unnecessary in ensuring that a woman’s right to choose not become secondary to the State’s interest in protecting the life of the fetus, and therefore, it is not part of the essential holding of Roe v. Wade. In replacement of Roe v. Wade’s “strict scrutiny” analysis, we adopt the “undue burden” analysis, under which the Legislature cannot make a law that is too burdensome or estrictive of one’s fundamental rights. Though a woman has the right to choose to terminate her pregnancy before viability, the State should not prohibited from taking steps to ensure that her choice is thoughtful and informed.
The State may require a woman to give written informed consent to an abortion after waiting at least 24 hours before undergoing an abortion after a physician informs the woman of the nature of the procedure. This requirement is not considered a substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion; therefore, there is no undue burden. The State may not require spousal notification because is likely to revent many women from obtaining an abortion due to the possibly of spousal abuse. It may impose a substantial obstacle, causing the woman undue burden; therefore, it is invalid.
The State may require a minor to obtain consent from a parent or guardian, or authorization from a court in order to undergo an abortion. A minor may benefit from consultation with their parents prior to undergoing the procedure, as children will often not realize that their parents have their best interests at heart. The State may require that facilities providing abortion services eep certain records and report certain provisions that are reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal health as long as they properly respect a patient’s confidentiality and privacy.
The collection of information with respect to actual patients is a vital element of medical research, and the requirement does not impose a substantial obstacle to a woman’s choice. We rule that all of the provisions at issue in this case, except that relating to spousal notice, are constitutional. DECISION: Affirmed in part, reversed in part. RULE: We have found that it is constitutional to require women eeking an abortion to obtain informed consent, to wait 24 hours after being provided with certain information by her doctor, and, if a minor, to obtain parental or court consent, due to that none of these provisions cause undue burden.
It is constitutional to require facilities which provide abortion services to adhere to certain reporting and record keeping mandates. It is unconstitutional to require a married woman seeking an abortion to sign a statement indicating that she has notified her husband on the basis that it may cause undue burden. CONCURRING OPINIONS: Stevens: Acknowledging that he State’s interest in protecting the fetus may be legitimate, it does not tell us when that interest overrides the pregnant woman’s right to personal liberty.
The interest in protecting potential life is not grounded in the Constitution, as it was decided in Roe v. Wade that a fetus is not a person, while a person’s right to liberty is grounded in the Constitution. As was decided in Rochin v. California, a person has a right to bodily integrity which includes the right to undergo an abortion. The woman’s constitutional liberty interest involves her freedom to ecide matters of the highest privacy and the most personal nature.
Under the principles established in cases such as Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, as well as Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. , the requirement that a physician is to provide the woman with a range of materials designed to persuade her to choose not to undergo the abortion is unconstitutional. The requirement that a physician is to inform a woman of the nature and risks of the abortion procedure and the medical risks of carrying to term are; however, neutral requirements nd therefore, is constitutional. A burden may be “undue” either because the burden is too severe or because it lacks a legitimate, rational justification.
The 24-hour waiting period required by the Pennsylvania statute is unconstitutional because it is likely to reduce the number of abortions and because it ensures that the woman’s decision is informed and thoughtful, thus furthering the State’s interest in potential life. A woman who decides to terminate her pregnancy is entitled to the same respect as a woman who decides to carry the fetus to term and the mandatory waiting period denies women that qual respect. It is “undue burden” because there is no evidence that such a delay serves a useful and legitimate purpose.
The interpretation of the “undue burden” standard is unclear, the “strict scrutiny” analysis is preferable. DISSENTING OPINIONS: Rehnquist: Roe v. Wade was wrongly decided and should be overturned; but notwithstanding, the decision in Roe v. Wade is not directly implicated by the Pennsylvania statute. The majority opinion argued that the right to privacy guaranteed to us in the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution stands in this case ut unlike marriage, procreation and contraception, abortion involves the purposeful termination of potential life and therefore, must be recognized as sui generis rather than as stare decisis.
The “undue burden” standard, adopted by the majority is an unjustified constitutional compromise which puts the Court in a position to scrutinize abortion regulations despite the fact that it lacks the power to do so under the Constitution. While we disagree with Roe v. Wade’s “strict scrutiny” standard, it had a recognized basis in constitutional law at the time it was decided. Under the “undue burden” standard, however, judges will have to decide whether they place a “substantial obstacle” in the path of a woman seeking an abortion.
This will allow judges to decide in a way that substantiate their personal views. The correct analysis is that a woman’s interest in having an abortion is a form of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, but States may regulate abortion procedures in ways related to legitimate notification furthers legitimate state interests because a husband’s interests in procreation within marriage and in the ate interest.
The requirement of spousal potential life of his unborn child are certainly substantial ones, the State itself has legitimate interests in protecting the interests of the father and in protecting the potential life of the fetus, and the State has a legitimate interest in promoting the integrity of the marital relationship as this Court has previously recognized in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth. The spousal notice provision is in accordance with the Constitution. Each of the challenged provisions of the Pennsylvania statute is consistent with the Constitution and should be upheld.
