The second strategic factor that influenced the outbreak of WWI was a pervasive sense of nationalism in France and Germany. Much of the French nationalism grew out of disdain for the Germans following the Franco-Prussian War when Germany annexed the Alsace-Lorraine region. Germany had not only taken a part of French territory, but had arrogantly paraded their success in the face of the French. The French had assured the inhabitants of the region that they would remain a part of the French nation. The bitterness of the event created not only a hatred for the Germans, but a desired to one day rise up and make France great again.
Victor Hugo, a famous French author, wrote of how France would reconstitute, study the enemy, and one day take back Alsace-Lorraine. This event in combination with the persistent fear of another German invasion bolstered the French pride and will. The French believed that despite being militarily inferior, the spirit of the French people would lead them to victory against Germany when the time came. However, a sense of nationalism was growing strong in Germany as well. Nationalism had been present in Germany since the founding of the German Empire in 1871.
The new empire renewed a sense of confidence and unity among the German people. The Napoleonic wars had promoted nationalism across Europe while nations struggled to gain power and strength, but it was especially strong in Germany. The Germans had a general belief that they were a superior people, and they deserved to be the ruling power in Europe. Friedrich von Bernhardi, a German General, wrote a book entitled “Germany and the Next War” in 1910, in which he said, “We must secure to German nationality and German spirit throughout the globe that high esteem which is due them.
He goes on in his writing to talk about the necessity for Germany to not only wage war, but to also become a world power. General Moltke, the Chief of the German General Staff during the war, had been planning for the The Day, Der Tag, for ten years. This was the day that Germany would at last go to war and establish dominance across Europe. General Moltke told King Albert of Belgium, “Your Majesty cannot imagine the irresistible enthusiasm which will permeate Germany on The Day. ”
The bitterness of the Germans towards the French was evident since the Franco-German War, and the Germans found the French to be a weak and decadent culture. When the war broke out, a German newspaper reported on the wonderful event; the war they had all been waiting for had finally begun. It stated, “The sword which has been forced into our hand will not be sheathed until our aims are won and our territory extended as far as necessity demands. ” While the entire population did not share this excitement for the war, it is a symptom of the common held nationalistic view of many of the German people.
This sense of superiority and German nationalism had spurred the Germans to prepare for, and even joyfully anticipate, this war for many years before the outbreak occurred. The result of this nationalism in the two nations was a transformed way of thinking in the minds of key decision makers. A beneficial concept for examining this impact on thinking is the Centrality Principle by International Relations analyst, Robert Jervis. Jervis discusses how individuals will develop a central belief system, and events early in life will have a strong influence on those events.
Once that central belief system is in place, it is very difficult for individuals to accept information that is contrary to that system. In the political realm, when one country views another as hostile, it is extremely difficult to ever alter that perception. Most of the leaders during the time of the outbreak of WWI had lived through the Franco-Prussian War in their younger years and had subsequently been exposed to that pervasive post-war nationalism. War and hostility had shaped their central belief system, and they were prepared and waiting for war. All they needed was a reason to set their plans into motion.
That reason would manifest with the assassination of the apparent Austrian heir, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, by Serbian nationalists on June 28, 1914. This act resulted in Austria declaring war on Serbia, and Russia mobilizing in preparation to support Serbia. The responsibility to honor alliances and manage the balance of power suddenly set all the countries on high alert. Despite the extremely high tensions and military movement, there was still the potential for the nations to diplomatically come to terms and avert conflict. This leads to the third strategic factor influencing the outbreak.
The organizational behavior of the militaries, specifically the overarching belief that victory could only be achieved through a swift and strong offense and decisive battle, played a detrimental role in the decision making process. A useful model for explaining how organizations can affect decision making is the Organizational Behavior Model. While there are perhaps times and situations when the responsibility of a decision falls to a single individual, it is more common that there are organizations in play that influence or direct the outcome of decisions.
The Organizational Behavior Model holds to the theory that decisions are most commonly the result of outputs of large organizations which have standard methods of operation. A key concept in this model is the idea of “logic of consequences” versus “logic of actions. ” The logic of consequences carefully weighs the consequences of a specific decision, whereas the logic of actions matches a specific rule set to a situation based on what is most appropriate. Individuals are more likely to employ the logic of consequences, whereas organizations are more likely to favor the logic of actions.
Imagine a military that has a carefully constructed a war plan for a specific situation. When the trigger for that situation occurs, the organization will focus their decision making on the most appropriate course of action, which they have theoretically already determined. This concept will assist in reviewing the decision making that occurred before the outbreak of WWI. In light of this model, it is evident that the military played a very large role in shaping the decisions following the assassination of the archduke. Each of the countries’ militaries was operating under the belief that the way to win is to attack quickly and decisively.
This introduced an urgency and rigidness from the military aspect that would greatly influence the potentially cooler heads of the civilian leadership. Clausewitz was a pivotal contributor to the German way of war and said that the “decisive battle” was the first objective in an offensive war. The Germans embraced this concept and focused their planning efforts on being the first to occupy Brussels, believing this was imperative to gaining the advantage. The German Schlieffen Plan rested on the concepts of a quick and decisive battle, and the Generals planned it to the most finite detail.
Although addressing many contingencies, this plan left little room for deviation, especially in the realm of time. The French planners also placed heavy emphasis on the decisive battle and offensive operations, as was directed in their newly released Field Regulations. The French too had studied Clausewitz, and determined that seizure of the imitative was imperative. The concept that “All command decisions must be inspired by the will to seize and retain the initiative” was pervasive in the minds of military leaders that would ultimately influence the pre-war decisions.
Despite intelligence and indications that a defensive posture would be more successful, the French planners, indoctrinated to the concept of the offensive, developed Plan 17. This plan involved a deployment of forces that would march to the Rhine, and the planners believed it would mark a distinct French victory in European history. The French plan also required that Russia mobilize quickly on Germany’s other front in order to force a two-front war. Recognizing that Russia would be slow to mobilize, the French Chief of War Ministry visited Russia to emphasize the necessity of seizing the initiative.
This intrinsic belief of the need for offensive battle, coupled with rigid and detailed plans, shaped the decision making of the military leaders, and in turn, the decision making of the chiefs of state. On 28 July when Austria declared war on Serbia, the mobilization of forces began. When Russia mobilized in preparation to defend Serbia, the Germans were faced with a critical decision. The Schlieffen plan depended on Germany defeating France before Russia could mobilize to challenge the second German front. Timing was of the essence.
Likewise, the French knew that French and Russian forces would need to mobilize quickly to simultaneously challenge the Germans. Nations began to send ultimatums with requirements to cease mobilization, but the generals were committed to the timelines that their plans demanded. The threat of war was imminent and on every side, and the civilian chiefs of state were slaves to the military leaders who would not dare lose the initiative. The German Kaiser admitted that he did not want a general war, and at one point told General Moltke to stop a deployment of forces towards Belgium.
General Moltke responded that it could not be stopped because the timeline was set, and the preparations had been made. The French civil leaders were slightly more resistant to the repeated requests by the French generals for mobilization, but with enough pressure, the government finally approved a mobilization, despite their reluctance. With forces on all front and tense anticipation in the air, Germany informed Belgium that a message of an alleged French intention to advance had been received, and that Germany must anticipate the hostility and act out of self-preservation.
Shortly thereafter, all diplomatic efforts failed and the militaries were unleashed to carry out their war plans with an unstoppable momentum. This organizational belief in the necessity for the offensive drove the leadership on both sides to sever the diplomatic efforts early and choose the “logic of actions” versus the “logic of consequences. These three strategic factors best explain the root causes of the outbreak of WWI. The importance of maintaining a balance of power to ensure national security is of vital interests to nation states, and the upset to that balance can lead to extreme measures.
Additionally, the upset to the balance of power is exacerbated when the rising power has shown to be extremely nationalistic and self-serving. This nationalism can transform the thinking of key leaders and cloud their judgement in critical moments. Finally, the tension and consistent anticipation of hostilities can create an organizational behavior that greatly favors war, and this in turn, can drive decision makers to rash and destructive decisions. The deadly combination of these three factors allowed a single event in history to unfold into a world war with disastrous consequences.